Alan Krueger, a master-economist for our age

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/TimHarford/~3/7B-xFeA5yxY/

http://timharford.com/?p=4938

Undercover Economist

Written for and first published in the Financial Times on 22 March 2019.

At the start of John Maynard Keynes’s obituary of Alfred Marshall comes a question: why is it so hard to be a good economist? Keynes’s answer was that “the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts . . . no part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard.”

This week the profession is mourning another great economist. Alan Krueger killed himself last weekend at the age of 58. What would be a bewildering blow under any circumstances is heavier still because the professor was an authority on happiness and pain.

He discovered, for example, that prime-age men who had quit the labour force were twice as likely as employed men to take painkillers. He studied how unemployed people spend their hours, and showed that actively searching for work was an intensely sad task.

With Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, he collected evidence on happiness that remains my benchmark for social scientists’ ability to shed light on wellbeing. Prof Kahneman once warned me that expert advice can go only so far. Much happiness and sadness is genetically determined: “We shouldn’t expect a depressive person to suddenly become extroverted and leaping with joy.” Those words are much on my mind this week.

Yet Krueger’s life invites us to reflect on what economists at their best can achieve. The most obvious fact to note about his career is its breadth. He studied pollution, inequality, social mobility, terrorism, the gig economy, and the music industry.

This is a vivid illustration of the versatility of the economist’s tools, but Krueger used them to make a lasting mark. The most famous example, with his colleague David Card, was a study of the impact of minimum wages on jobs. It stands to reason that every increase in a minimum wage will destroy marginal jobs, hurting some of the most vulnerable people in the workforce.

Profs Card and Krueger, however, weren’t content to stick with the theory. They wanted to know how big the effect was. This is a tough problem. While minimum wages might cause unemployment, a booming job market might influence politicians to raise the minimum wage, so cause and effect are tangled together. Their research, therefore, looked at fast-food industry jobs in two neighbouring states: New Jersey and Pennsylvania, only one of which had raised the wage floor. They found the rise hadn’t dented employment at all.

Not every economist was convinced, and by itself that result might have been a fluke. But the pair had developed a powerful method that could — and would — be repeated. Economists are now far more willing to allow that minimum wage increases can make sense.

Perhaps just as important, economists now believe that evidence can complement or even overturn theory. Economics was once theory-driven for a reason: the data was patchy and controlled experiments were rare. It was almost unheard of to produce evidence that was credible enough to outweigh theory.

Krueger was at the heart of what became known as the credibility revolution in economics: the idea that evidence could be powerful enough to make a difference — and that economists should gather and analyse it with that aim in mind. In a tweet last year, he declared: “The idea of turning economics into a true empirical science, where core theories can be rejected, is a BIG, revolutionary idea.”

However, while voraciously curious, Krueger had no interest in clever studies for their own sake. (Even his whimsical investigation of the music business, fuelled by personal enthusiasm, teaches broader economic lessons. “I think Taylor Swift is an economic genius”, he said.) In general, he wanted to answer the big questions about human wellbeing.

His work on the gig economy is a case in point. With the rise of companies such as Uber it became clear that many workers were putting in highly irregular hours. He promptly started surveying workers about whether they relished the flexibility or suffered from the insecurity. He showed that these contingent work arrangements weren’t new — the Uber workforce was the new tip of a long-hidden iceberg. He chased down the answers to questions other people were only beginning to ask.

“He wouldn’t speculate,” says Betsey Stevenson, who, like Krueger, is a labour economist who held senior positions in the Obama administration. “He would gather the data.”

That data could then be used to influence policy, as he showed during three stints working for the US government, including as the chairman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers. He was also admired as a generous mentor of other economists: his influence goes well beyond his publications.

Were Keynes to be writing about the “master-economist” today, his list of requirements might have changed little: intensely curious about the human experience; energetic in gathering the data; willing to let the evidence change his or her views; a persuasive writer; determined to influence policy to improve the world. Nobody could have matched up better than Alan Krueger.

 

My book “Fifty Things That Made the Modern Economy” (UK) / “Fifty Inventions That Shaped The Modern Economy” (US) is out now in paperback – feel free to order online or through your local bookshop.

Free email updates

(You can unsubscribe at any time)

Superstar companies lose their lustre

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/TimHarford/~3/UZpeOHCwRtg/

http://timharford.com/?p=4934

Undercover Economist

Everyone seems to agree that we live in a “superstar economy” — one in which the leading companies (the likes of Apple, Amazon and Alphabet) are making dramatic strides both in productivity and in profitability. In response to this conventional wisdom the only question is: how should regulators respond?

There is a case that we should let the superstars keep doing what they do. Enjoy the fruits of their creativity. The smartphone! Internet search that works! Next-day delivery of next week’s landfill! For now, the superstars are innovative and efficient. In due course new monopolists will arise, motivated to seize the crown.

This case is not absurd, although my own instincts point the other way. Profit-minded monopolists can be innovative, but all too often they fail to adapt. More often markets deliver because they support a messy, pluralistic process of trial and error.

If that view is right, government intervention may be necessary to prevent the monopolies of today choking off the innovations of the future. One possibility is to break up the largest companies. Regulators might rule that a company cannot simultaneously own a platform while also offering products on it. This is the position taken in an artful argument published last week by US presidential hopeful Elizabeth Warren.

An alternative approach, set out this week by the UK’s Digital Competition Expert Panel, is to regulate the behaviour of the big digital groups rather than to change their structure. Regulators could insist on standards for data sharing and interconnection with established players, allowing smaller competitors to grow on or around the existing platforms.

I’m sympathetic to both approaches, although worry that it is easy for regulators to do more harm than good. Ms Warren’s rousing call to arms might easily lead to fruitless antitrust trench warfare. But set aside for a moment the argument about how to respond to the superstars and ask a different question. What if they are actually economic white dwarfs, dense but dim and fading?

That seems a strange conjecture. It appears to contradict the problem of laggard companies: research from the OECD suggests that many companies are far less productive than those at the frontier of their industrial sector, and that this gap is getting bigger. This suggests that superstars are blazing hot and the problem lies with the rest of the economy.

But much depends on what we mean by superstar companies. The OECD research focuses on highly productive concerns. Many of them are surprisingly small, with revenues in the tens of millions rather than the tens of billions.

Another alternative is to look at the most valuable 20 companies in the US economy, and the most valuable four in each of 60 or so different sectors, whether or not they are digital and whether or not they are highly productive. This is the approach taken by Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon, economists at New York University, in a new working paper. This perspective casts doubt on the very idea that the superstars of the US economy are particularly large or productive by postwar standards.

Compared with their forebears, these companies are unremarkable in both their sales and their employee numbers. They have a larger economic footprint than the leaders of 20 years ago, but smaller than 40 years ago. Alphabet, Amazon and Apple are impressive companies, but so were Intel, Microsoft and Walmart 20 years ago, or General Electric, General Motors and IBM before them.

Any large group contributes to the productivity of the economy as a whole in two ways: directly, by producing output, and indirectly, by drawing in resources from less productive players. Messrs Gutiérrez and Philippon reckon that the direct contribution of the leading companies is smaller than it used to be, while the indirect contribution has not increased by enough to compensate. Overall, they calculate that the contribution of the star companies to labour productivity growth in the US has fallen by 40 per cent since the year 2000.

This is a surprising result. Part of the explanation may lie in measurement: it is never easy to measure productivity, particularly in services and even more so in services provided free of charge in exchange for data and attention. But the “fading star” result may well be real, and surprising only because we often let the big digital groups stand as symbols of scale and market power. There is more to the US economy than Silicon Valley.

The US economy does seem to have a monopoly problem: concentration is increasing in most industries. Companies make money less by becoming more efficient, and more by exploiting their pricing power.

There is plenty for US antitrust authorities to get their teeth into. Perhaps they should take a look at Europe, where competition policy is more robust and politically independent, while EU markets have become more competitive and less profitable than those in the US. That may not be a coincidence.

Written for and first published in the Financial Times on 15 March 2019.

My book “Fifty Things That Made the Modern Economy” (UK) / “Fifty Inventions That Shaped The Modern Economy” (US) is out now in paperback – feel free to order online or through your local bookshop.

Free email updates

(You can unsubscribe at any time)